for explanation of abbreviations consensus democracies plus the composite scale of corporatism we can determine the relative weight of corporatism in explaining the variance of consociationalism (Table 4) . Although the bi-variate relationship between consensus democracy and corporatism is rather strong (r, = 0.64), the relative weight of corporatism is so small that it does not fit in the model. If compared to other factors, corporatism explains a negligible part in the variance of the features of consensus democracy as defined by Lijphart. Both concepts should be analysed independently, together with other political variables, in order to assess the extent to which each does indeed influence democratic decision making. We have demonstrated that both concepts are strongly intertwined with the type and the organization of the political system and also strongly related to the complexion of government and parliament. Although the concepts are apparently similar, they do not have the same meaning and can be distinguished empirically in relation to the features of liberal democratic decision making.
Linking and Integrating Corporatism and Consensus Democracy: Theory, Concepts and Evidence

M A R K U S M . L . C R E P A Z A N D A R E N D L I J P H A R T *
Hans Keman's and Paul Pennings's critique ('Managing Political and Societal Conflict in Democracies: Do Consensus and Corporatism Matter?', this Journal, preceding pages) of our attempt to link corporatism and consensus democracy falls essentially into three parts. Their first criticism deals with the way we measured corporatism. They reject our 'composite' approach on the basis that different experts have different conceptual understandings of corporatism. Hence, they argue, it is unwarranted to add up these various scores. Secondly, they claim that our central relationship between consensus * Department of Political Science, The University of Georgia; Department of Political Science, The University of California, San Diego, respectively. democracy and corporatism is a function of our particular measure of corporatism and, in addition, driven by two outlying cases: Italy and Austria. Thirdly, they claim that corporatism and consensus democracy are two different phenomena, and that therefore, corporatism should not be integrated into the concept of consensus democracy. We shall address these three main criticisms in the order described.
Keman's and Pennings's first criticism is that producing a composite measure of corporatism is unwarranted, since the various experts offering scores on corporatism had different meanings of that elusive concept in mind. They point to the difference between the institutional aspect of corporatism within the strategic actors, labour and capital, and the concertation aspect of corporatism between the strategic actors -a distinction which Schmitter referred to as 'corporatism 1' and 'corporatism 2'.' To this distinction, they add a third aspect: social partnership. We are well aware that our various experts operationalized corporatism differently based on different features of corporatism. In our original article, we explicitly mentioned Schmitter's distinction between the institutional aspects of corporatism such as hierarchical structures, centralization, organization, etc. (vertical corporatism), and 'concertation' which refers to the relationship among the strategic actors (horizontal corporatism).' While this is a useful distinction, the difference between 'concertation' and 'social partnership', which Keman and Pennings add as a third conceptually distinct class of corporatism, is less c~n v i n c i n~.We believe that the 'social partnership' and 'concertation' aspects are very closely related.
In creating a broadly based measure of corporatism, we wanted to produce a measure that was as impartial as possible. We did not want to rely on one individual measure because that would have invited the criticism that we chose a particular measure simply because it best fitted our argument, and because this would have made our results dependent on that individual's concept of corporatism. Since the level of measurement encompassed nominal, ordinal and interval data, standardization was a suitable statistical procedure to create a composite score.
The important concept of validity is defined in the social sciences as 'the extent to which our measures correspond to the concepts they are intended to reflect'. ' this definition we measured exactly what we wanted to measure, which was to provide an overall average score of corporatism based on the combined wisdom of different experts on that subject, notwithstanding differences among those experts with respect to the conceptual meaning of corporatism. Thus Keman's and Pennings's claim that our index is 'meaningless in terms of validity' is simply i n~o r r e c t .~ If the countries in our Table 1 are ordered from most to least corporatist the following order emerges: Austria, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, Germany, Finland, Belgium, Japan, Ireland, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United states6 This is very much in accordance with the conventional wisdom on the relative strength of corporatism in various countries. In fact, even Keman's own corporatism score,' which is not included in our composite measure correlates very strongly with our measure ( r = 0.870). Frederic Pryor's measure of corporatism, also not included in our composite measure, correlates even more strongly with our scores ( r = 0.963).'
More importantly, both elements of corporatism, i.e. within institutions and between actors, can be observed simultaneously in practice. In order for concertation between strategic actors to be successful, a strong institutional structure (capacity to co-operate) organizing the interests within strategic actors is a prerequisite. We say as much in our original a r t i~l e .~ Moreover, for corporatism to be successful the willingness of the functional bodies to co-operate is equally crucial. Thus, both elements, institutional capacity and willingness, have to be present in order successfully to intermediate between the major functional groups in industrial societies. If this is the case, it does not matter much whether the scores of the individual expert judgements sometimes measure 'institutionalization' and sometimes measure 'concertation'. In fact, precisely because we were aware that various experts attributed different features to the concept of corporatism, our aim was to create an overall average of the experts' combined wisdom. Lehmbruch seems to agree with this assessment when he, after describing various distinct forms of corporatism such as sectoral corporatism and tripartism, states that, 'I have earlier (1982) argued that, since these different developments [of corporatism] are interrelated, they should be integrated into apluridimensional concept of' corporrrtism. This should permit a rctnking of countries for the purpose of crossncttionrrl comparison and for the investigation of empiricctl regularities.""e concur with Lehmbruch's statement.
C O N N E C T I N G C O R P O R A T I S M W I T H C O N S E N S U S D E M O C R A C Y
The second criticism from Keman and Pennings deals with the empirical relationship between corporatism and consensus democracy and consists of two parts: first, they claim that our '(lump sum) measure [of corporatism] is among those that correlates strongest with [our] own index of consensus democracy'." Implicit in this criticism is the claim that the association between consensus democracy and corporatism is driven by the fashion in which we measured corporatism. Secondly, they question the statistical robustness of the empirical model pointing out that Austria and Italy are outliers artificially enhancing the strength of the model. Let us first examine the strength of the relationship between corporatism and consensus democracy. A closer look at Table 1 shows that our composite measure does not correlate the strongest with consensus democracy. The individual measures of Crouch, Lehmbruch and Wilensky correlate more strongly than our composite measure of corporatism. Four of the twelve measurements display an association stronger than 0.5; another four observations display an association between 0.4 and 0.5 (among them Keman's own measure), while the last third (four observations) show associations smaller than 0.4." There is general agreement among social scientists that correlation coefficients between + 1 -0.1 and +/ -0.4 denote 'weak' associations, between +/ -0.4 and + / -0.7 denote 'medium' ones and between +/ -0.7 and + / -0.9 denote 'strong' associations.
Our corporatism measure does not stand out in any way in terms of its relation to consensus democracy. Eight of the twelve individual measures fall between the 0.4 and 0.7 range which is widely considered to be the 'medium' range of strength of association and three individual scores are actually higher than our composite score. Keman's own measure of corporatism, although not included in our composite measure, falls into the same 'medium' class as our own measure. Similarly, Pryor's score of corporatism, again not part of our original composite index, shows an association of almost the same magnitude as our own index of corporatism.
The low correlation coefficient with the score of Marks is peculiar.' Marks looked mainly at neocorporatist incomes policy and created a weighted composite score according to the number of years in which countries displayed 'mixed', 'weak', 'moderate' or 'strong' incomes policies. His rankings indeed deviate from more conventional views on the strength of corporatist arrangements in different countries. For instance, he ranks Switzerland, France, Italy. the United States and Canada equally low on neocorporatist incomes policy. Great Britain is ranked before Denmark in neocorporatist incomes policy and Ireland is ranked between these two countries. Nevertheless, we decided to integrate Marks's score into our overall score. despite his 'unconventional' rankings which explain his relatively low correlation coefficient with consensus democracy.
Keman's and Pennings's second point deals with the robustness of the empirical relationship between corporatism and consensus democracy. They argue that 'the location of the outliers Austria and Italy, h~,ing symmetrically aligned on either side of the regression line also strengthens the statistical outcome of the correlation coefficient .. . The central relationship is less robust and overlapping than is claimed by Lijphart and Crepaz.""heir observation that two points symmetrically aligned on either side of a regression line should strengthen a relationship. indicates a misunderstanding of the concept of 'outliers'. They present an influence chart relying on two black 'dots' for identification of outliers. Fortunately, Belseley, Kuh and Welsch have devised a systematic way of not only detecting outliers but also leverage points.'5 ''Lijphart and Crepaz, 'Corporatism and Consensus Democracy', p. 238. Table 2 provides the studentized residuals (residuals divided by their estimated standard deviations), which obviously follow a t-distribution, and the 'leverage points' (the values of the diagonal 'hat'-matrix) for eighteen countries. Leverage points identify outliers in the independent variable space. i.e. these are observations to which parameter estimates are particularly sensitive. Contrary to the claim by Keman and Pennings, only Austria proves to be an 'outlier', as can be seen from Table 2 .16 T h e removal of Austria from the dataset does not reduce the strength of the relationship, in fact its omission increases the strength of the bivariate relationship. Since the 'studentized residuals' follow a r-distribution, * 'Outliers' are residuals divided by their estimated standard deviation. Since studentized residuals follow a t-distribution, the critical cut-off point is -t 2.120 (0.05 level. two tailed) for 16 degrees of freedom. t Leverage points are the diagonal elements of the 'hat' matrix. Values larger than 0.222 indicate observations with high leverage, i.e. the slope will be sensitive to these observations. There are no observations that exceed that threshold for leverage points.
intercept than on the parameter estimate." However, outliers do not exert sufficient leverage on the parameter estimates to change the coefficients as opposed to leverage points drastically. Belseley, Kuh and Welsch suggest as a critical threshold for leverage points 2plN, where p stands for the number of estimated parameters (including the constant), N for the number of cases.'X The critical threshold, then, in our case is 0.222. Table 2 indicates that none of the leverage points displays values larger than the critical threshold, indicating that none of the observations have leverage enough to sufficiently disturb the parameter estimates. Table 3 provides further evidence that the omission of Austria does not drastically change the effect on the parameter estimates. The table also shows that the central relationship between consensus democracy and corporatism holds (in fact, its strength and significance improves) if not only Austria but also Italy are removed from the dataset. Contrary to Keman's and Pennings's claim, inclusion of the Austrian and Italian case actually weakens, rather than strengthens, the relationship. It is not at all the case that Austria and Italy 'drive' the statistical relationship as they claim. In fact, removing either Austria or Italy, or both, strengthens the parameter estimates.I9 However, we decided " Belseley, Kuh and Welsch, Regression Dicrgnostirs. p. 7.
Belseley, Kuh and Welsch, Regressiorl Dicrgnostic.~, p. 17.
l9 As indicated above, Italy's studentized residual value ( -1.963)does not exceed the critical cut-off point of 3-2.12 (two-tailed, 16degrees of freedom, at the 0.05level), which does not qualify it for an outlier. However, since Keman and Pennings argue that ltaly is an outlier, and since ltaly is close to the cut-off point, we decided to report the effects of Italy's omission individually and in conjunction with Austria on the parameter estimates. to report the findings with all eighteen countries and not to omit observations selectively so as to create a stronger fit artificially. Tables 2 and 3 provide strong evidence for the robustness of our central relationship and invalidate Keman's and Pennings's claim that the association between corporatism and consensus democracy is a statistical artefact.
C O R P O R A T I S M A S AN E L E M E N T O F C O N S E N S U S D E M O C R A C Y
Thirdly, Keman and Pennings argue against integrating corporatism into the concept of consensus democracy by pointing out that these are two different phenomena. As evidence they present correlation coefficients indicating that corporatism and consensus democracy correlate distinctively with the complexion of government and parliament, and with cabinet duration. While this may be the case, we clearly did not intend to show, in the words of Keman and Pennings, that 'corporatism and consensus democracy were in fact and in theory two sides of the same coin'.20 Instead, we claimed that 'corporatism is the interest group system that goes together with the consensual type of democracy and its opposite, the "pluralist" interest group system, goes together with majoritarian democrac.''' After we had established an empirical link between corporatism and consensus democracy, the next logical step was to integrate the corporatist/pluralist system of interest representation into the cluster of consensus/majoritarian political institutions. Undoubtedly, the inclusive, accommodative and consensus-oriented corporatist policymaking process is conceptually related to the five more 'political' elements of consensus democracy: the sharing of executive power; balanced executive-legislative relations; a high degree of electoral proportionality; multi-party systems and multiple issue dimensions of partisan conflict. Similarly, the competitive, atomistic and exclusive pluralist policy-making style is conceptually related to political structures which encourage little sharing of executive power (minimal winning cabinets), strong executives, electoral disproportionality, and two-party systems characterized by a single issue dimension. We believe that the affinity between corporatism and consensus democracy, and between pluralism and majoritarianism is compelling, and there is no reason why the interest group system should not be linked to the political and " Keman and Pennings, 'Managing Political and Societal Conflict', p. 6.
Lijphart and Crepaz, 'Corporatism and Consensus Democracy', p. 235. constitutional structures. In our original article, we presented the connection between consensus democracy and corporatism in its aggregated form. Do we also find rneaningful associations between corporatism and its disaggregated elements of consensus democracy? How do the five original individual elements of consensus democracy, described above, associate with corporatism? Table 4 indicates that corporatism correlates with each individual element of consensus democracy in the hypothesized way, i.e. it is consistent with the argument made above that corporatism can logically be integrated into the cluster of consensus democracy. The negative correlation between corporatism and the percentage in which minimal winning coalitions were in power ( -0.460) indicates that corporatism can be thought of as an element of consensus democracy. The same logic applies to the other negative correlation coefficients between corporatism and executive dominance and electoral disproportionality. The more corporatist a country, the less dominant is the executive (although the coefficient is a weak one, -0.126). Also, the more corporatist a country, the less disproportional is its electoral system ( -0.661). Moreover, the number of issue dimensions in partisan conflict and the effective number of parties also correlate in a predictable way with corporatism. Corporatist countries display a higher number of issue dimensions of partisan conflict (0.488) while also showing a higher effective number of parties (0.451). Overall, the correlation coefficients between corporatism and the other five elements of consensus democracy (in the bottom row of Table 4 ) are about as strong as the ten correlation coefficients among these other five elements; the means of the absolute values are 0.435 and 0.482 respectively, and the medians are 0.45 1 and 0.446 respectively. Table 4 shows a consistent and predictable relationship of corporatism with each of the disaggregated elements of consensus democracy. Given this affinity between corporatism and the tive constitutive elements of consensus democracy we perceived it as logical to integrate it as an additional element of consensus democracy, and we believe that integrating all six into a more comprehensive concept of consensus democracy leads to a richer understanding of the process by which private desires are turned into actual public policies.
